题 目：The Right-to-Repair Paradox in Agriculture: Profit, Welfare, and Productivity

主讲人：王钟彬 教授（天津大学）

时 间：2026年1月16日15:00

地 点：

讲座内容：

The "right-to-repair" (RTR) movement is transforming regulations across various sectors, including automotive, consumer electronics, and especially agriculture. The agricultural sector is distinct due to its durable equipment, essential functions in crop productivity, and long repair times that significantly disrupt output. Although the right-to-repair movement has been frequently advanced in agriculture, the impact of this initiative, given the sector's unique challenges, remains a significant yet unexplored issue. Utilizing a continuous-time, infinite-horizon, sequential game model involving one manufacturer and a heterogeneous group of farmers, we examine the impact of RTR on manufacturer profits, farmer payoffs, and overall productivity in a congestion-prone repair system. Our findings are as follows: High-output farmers may be less (or more) inclined to opt for self-repair when manufacturer repair delays are short (or long), compared to low-output farmers. Additionally, the optimal repair pricing exhibits a non-monotonic response to varying levels of RTR. When repair delays are negligible, RTR is harmful to manufacturer profits but enhances farmer payoffs and societal productivity. In contrast, when repair delays are non-negligible, RTR can lead to either lose-lose-lose or win-win-win outcomes for all involved, depending on whether the manufacturer's repair capacity cost is relatively low or high. Interestingly, the manufacturer, initially viewed as the primary victim of the RTR movement, could ultimately become its sole beneficiary when the capacity cost is moderate.

主讲人简介：

王钟彬，天津大学管理与经济学部英才教授。主要研究方向为随机服务运营，排队经济学。主持国家优秀青年科学基金，青年科学基金，以及中国科协青年人才托举工程项目。博士论文入选第六届“系统科学与系统工程科学技术奖”优秀博士学位论文奖和2021年管理科学与工程学会“优秀博士学位论文奖励计划”。相关学术成果曾获2022年“全国供应链与运营管理”最佳会议论文一等奖，2021年美国运筹学与管理学研究协会(INFORMS)服务科学最佳论文一等奖。

主办单位：

管理科学与工程学院供应链与运营管理研究中心

商学院可持续制造与供应链创新研究团队

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